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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LYNN W. MARTIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 7731

-vs.PAUL H. STEVENS,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

FACTS
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the
court below.
The statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief
is substantially correct, but we desire to make the following comments :
At the bottom of page 1 of plaintiff's brief, it is
stated that plaintiff looked to the east and saw that it was
clear and then proceeded into the intersection. Although
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the plaintiff testified that he looked to the east it is manifest that it was not clear. From the testimony of plaintiff's own witness, Lawrence B. Rogers, an engineer, and
from plaintiff's Exhibit D, it is determinable that at a
point 20 feet north of the south sidewalk on Stratford
Avenue, the plaintiff had good vision to the east for a
distance of 205 feet and at a point 15 feet north of the
sidewalk, he had vision to the east to a distance of 465
feet. After clearing the line of trees between the sidewalk and the road, he had an unobstructed and unlimited
vision to the east. It follows therefore, that either the
plaintiff failed to look at all to the east at any point in
his line of travel where he would have a good view to the
east, or else, having looked to the east failed to take heed
of the defendant's approaching automobile.
It is also stated in plaintiff's brief that plaintiff's
automobile was knocked west on Stratford Avenue o:ver
two front yards and a hedge, coming to a rest at a distance of 156 feet from the point of impact. While it appears that plaintiff's car came to rest 156 feet from the
point of impact, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to warrant the conclusion that it was knocked that
distance by the. force of defendant's automobile striking
it. It is at least equally probable that plaintiff's car
traveled this distance under its own power while out
of the control of the plaintiff who was knocked unconcious in the collision.
Plaintiff has failed to mention the testimony of plaintiff himself, that he traveled at least 20 feet south on 18th
East Street with a clear view to the east, and by his own
testimony he could stop within a distance of five feet
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at the rate of speed at 'Yhich he 'Yns traveling. (R. 48,
49). By his o'Yn testilnony he never sa'v the defendant's
car until he heard its brakes squeal, 'vhich would have
been 'vhen it 'Yas no further than 57 feet away (R. 42),
and he admitted that he might have told the defendant
that he never did see him. (R. 51). Plaintiff has also failed
to mention in his brief the testin1ony of Harold Peterson
the investigating police officer who testified that at the
time he investigated the accident, immediately after its
occurrence, that the plaintiff admitted to him; that he
never did see the defendant's car. (R. 86). The testimony
of Officer Peterson was not contradicted or rebutted by
the testimony of any other witness and Officer Peterson
having been called by the plaintiff and being a disinterested witness, the plaintiff is bound by his testimony.
The plaintiff's own testimony, and that of the witnesses
called by him, clearly established that the accident was
caused, at least in part, by the plaintiff's own failure to
keep a proper look-out

POINTS TO BE ARGUED

I.
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE SHOWED CONCLUSIVELY AND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
WHICH WAS A SUBSTANTIAL PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT AND THE INJURIES AND DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF.

ARGUMENT
Since the decision of this Court in the case of Bullock
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v. Luke, 98 Pac. (2d) 350, rendered on January 22, 1940,
this court has decided a number of cases involving the
respective rights, duties and liabilities of the parties to
an intersection collision. We have carefully examined all
of the cases which we have been able to discover from
this court which deal with that question, in an attempt to
determine the rules applicable to the drivers involved in
intersection collisions.
From our study of the decisions we believe that the
following rules are deducible and may be said to be the
established law of this state.
1. Regardless of which driver technically has the
right of way, both drivers have the duty to exercise vigilance for other traffic which may be approaching or entering the intersection, and failure to exercise that duty is
negligence as a matter of law. If that principle had not
been previously established it was definitely laid do·wn
as the law of this state in Bullock v. Luke, supra. We find
no dissent from that proposition in any of the cases subsequently decided by this court; it has been reiterated
in most of the decisions subsequent to the Bullock case,
and in the most recent expression of opinion, we find
the principle reaffirmed. This Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Wade in the case of Lowder v. Holley, 233
P. (2d) 350 said:
"Appellants are correct in stating that before
entering an inte-rsection the driver of a car 1nust
look and determine whether it is safe to enter."
We do not understand that plaintiff questions this
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rule, and \Ye mention it here merely for the purpose of
developing our argument.
2. In most situations both parties to an intersection collision are guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
In making this assertion, \Ye are fully mindful of the decisions of this court in the cases of llf artin v. Sheffield,
112l~t. 478, 189 Pac. (2d) 127; Hess v. Robinson, 109 Ut.
60, 163 P. (:2d) 510 and Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d)
350. We think it requires no extended argument to show
that in the case of Bullock v. Luke, supra; Sine v. Salt
Lake Transportation Co., 147 Pac. (2d) 875; Hickok v.
Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh,
113 Ut. 276, 193 Pac. (2d) 437; and Gren v. Norton, 213
Pac. (2d) 356, it was held that both of the drivers involved in the intersection collisions in those cases were
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. In each of those
cases it was further held that the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of the accident and in each
case he was denied recovery.
In the cases of Martin v. Sheffield, Hess v. Robinson
and Lowder v. Holley, there is language which somewhat
indicates that the question of the. plaintiff's negligence
was for the trier of fact. However, we be·lieve that a careful study of the opinions of this court in those cases will
reveal that the true. holding was that the question reserved for the trier of fact was not whether or not the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but whether or not the
negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of his
injuries.
In Hess v. Robinson, the plaintiff was proceeding
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southerly on an arterial street in Ogden. Streets inter. secting with the street on which he was driving were stop
signed. The plaintiff failed to observe the defendant's
ambulance approaching from his right, and the ambulance
ran through the stop sign and into and against the plaintiff. The trial court held that both parties were guilty
of negligence and specifically held that the plaintiff
was negligent in failing to observe the appro~ch of the
defendant's vehicle. However, the trial judge took the
position that even though the plaintiff had observed the
defendant's vehicle, he would have been justified in assuming that it would stop for the stop sign, and that
therefore he was entitled to proceed into and through
the intersection until it became apparent to him that the
defendant would not respect his right of way. The court
reasoned that by the time it became apparent to the plaintiff that the defendant would not obey the stop sign it
might have been too late for the plaintiff to avert the
accident, and therefore, it was for the jury to determine
whether his failure to observe the defendant's automobile
was a proximate or legal cause of the accident. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff which
was affirmed by this court. In the leading opinion, \vri tten by Chief Justice Larson and concurred in by Justice
Turner, the theory of the trial judge was followed. Justice Wade concurred in the result, saying that it was a
jury question whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the injury. It is not
altogether clear in the opinion of Justice Wade whether
it was intended to hold that the question of negligence
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\ras for the jury, or 1nerely 'vhether the question for
the jury \\?as \vhether the negligence of the plaintiff was
the proxin1ate cause of the accident. The implication
fron1 his language as \ve understand it, is that the negligence \vas recognized to exist and his concurrence \vas
based on the vie'v that only the question of proximate
cause \vas for the jury. Justice Wolfe concurred in the
result on the theory that the question of negligence of
the plaintiff, as well as the question of proximate cause
was for the jury, and in this opinion 1\Ir. Justice McDonough concurred.
\\T e are unable to harmonize the concurring opinion
of Justice Wolfe with the rules laid down before and
since. In his opinion he did not depart from the principle above stated, i.e. that both parties have a duty to
observe for other traffic approaching or entering an intersection. On the contrary he stated: "but we held it a
salutary rule that one who had the right of way still has
the duty not to exercise it if he did or could have ascertained that another was not going to give it to him
and that his insisting upon his right of way under those
circumstances was contributory negligence." It was admitted in the case of Hess v. Robinson that the plaintiff
did not see the defendant's appToaching vehicle, and we
are therefore unable to understand how it can be said
that it was a question for the trier of fact whether or not
he was guilty of negligence. However, we are in full
agreement with the view that the question of whether
or not the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate
cause of the accident was a question for the jury in that
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case, since the plaintiff was entitled to assume that the
defendant would yield to him until it became apparent to
the plaintiff that the defendant would not yield, which
might have been too late for the plaintiff to avert the
accident.
In the case of Martin v. Sheffield, 189 Pac. (2d) 127,
the plaintiff who had been traveling west on Wilson Avenue, testified that she observed to her left when she was
about 50 feet east of the intersection with Tenth East
and that at the time she could see about 75 feet south of
the intersection and that she saw no car approaching.
She did not look again until after she was in the intersection and she did not observe the defendant's vehicle
approaching until immediately before the accident. Although there is language in the opinion of the court which
indicates that the question of the plaintiff's negligence
was for the jury, we think that the true holding of the
court was that the question for the jury was whether the
plaintiff's failure to look to the left at any time between
the time she first observed and the time she entered the
intersection was a proximate cause of the accident. This
court, speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough said:
"There was a conflict in the evidence as to her
speed, as to the defendant's speed, and as to
whether defendant stopped before the collision or
stopped after the impact with plaintiff's car.
These factors would all have bearing on whether
failure of plaintiff to look to her left the instant
she entered the intersection contributed to the accident or p;revertted her from stopping her car
short of the point of impact or prevented her
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from ttttrning to the right to avoid the collision."
(Italics ours).
The court further observed as follows:
'•If reasonable minds might differ a.s to which
version of events shall be believed, then reasonable
minds might likewise differ as to whether plaintiff~s own conduct contributed to the accident."
The fair purport of this language, as we understand it, is that the question of proxin1ate cause was for
the jury. To say that it was a question for the jury
whether plaintiff \vas negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout, in the face of her admission that she looked
only once before entering the intersection and did that
when her field of vision was limited to a distance of 75
feet and when she, herself, was about 50 feet from the
intersection, would seem to fly squarely into the face
of the apparently well established rule that· the plaintiff must keep a proper lookout for other automobiles
entering the intersection and that such observation should
be made at a point where observations will be reasonably
efficient for, and conduce to protection. Bullock v. L1tke,
supra.
In the recent case of Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d)
350, the plaintiff failed to observe the defendant's vehicle
approaching from the plaintiff's right. However, in that
case there was evidence from which the court could find
that at the time the plaintiff entered the intersection,
the defendant was at least 250 feet away, and that the
plaintiff would be entitled to assume that the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
would yield the right of way to him, and therefore, his
failure to observe the, defendant's approaching vehicle
was not a proximate cause of the accident. We are unable to harmonize the holding of the court in this case with
the holdings of the court in Hickok v. Skinner, supra;
Conklin v. Walsh, supra; and Gren v. Norton, supra,
wherein it was held that not only does the driver have a
duty to make observations before entering the intersection, but also to reobserve and to reappraise as he proceeds through the intersection. Whether or not it was
the intent of the court to overrule or modify those cases,
we do not know. Neither does it particularly matter so
far as the result of this case is concerned. We find nothing in Lowder v. Holley which is inconsistent with the
earlier cases of Bullock v. Luke and Sine v. Salt Lake
Transportation Company, upon which we rely. We
merely invite the court's attention to this matter to point
out that the Lowder case leaves the law in a somewhat
unsettled state that should be clarified when the matter is
again presented to the court in an appropriate case.
3.
Under certain circumstances the question of
whether the negligence of the party having the right of
way was the cause of the accident would be a jury question.
We have heretofore reviewed the decisions of this
court, observing that the question of proximate cause
was held to be for the jury, in three of the decided cases.
We are unable to deduce a general rule from those three
decisions. Perhaps the best that can be said is that where,
'under the facts of the particular case, reasonable minds
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might conclude that the favored driver might have entered the intersection, even though he had observed the
approach of the defendant, \Yith the expectation that the
defendant 'vould yield the right of 'vay to him, the question of \vhether or not the plaintiff's negligence was a
proximate cause of the accident must be for the trier of
fact and not be determined by the court as a 1natter of
law. Conversely, where the evidence is such that all
reasonable minds would agree that the failure of the
favored driver to observe the approach of the defendant's automobile was a proximate cause of the accident,
the plaintiff is precluded as a matter of law from recovermg.

If we are correct in our interpretation of the decisions of this court, there can be no doubt in this case
that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter
of law, under the general rule above stated that both
drivers involved in an intersection collision are guilty of
negligence as a matter of law. However, if we are mistaken in our unde-rstanding, and the rule is not so broad
as we have above stated, we are still of the opinion that
the facts and the evidence in this case compel a conclusion that the plaintiff failed to exercise a prope-r lookout or any lookout whatsoever, and he was therefore
negligent as a matter of law.
By his own admission the plaintiff never observed
the defendant's automobile until after the defendant
had applied his brakes, and it was the noise of the defendant's squealing brakes that attracted plaintiff's attention
to his approach. Thus the plaintiff never observed the
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defendant until after the emergency had arisen and the
defendant had already taken steps to avert or at least to
1ninimize the effects of the impending accident. There
is other evidence in the record and particularly the testimony of Officer Peterson, that the plaintiff never did
see the defendant. And the plaintiff himself admitted
that he might have told the defendant that he never saw
him. Plaintiff testified that he left only two feet of skid
marks and that he could stop in a distance of less than
five feet at the rate of speed at which he was traveling.
It is apparent, therefore, that had the plaintiff observed
the defendant's approach only a second before he did,
this accident would have been averted.
It is mathematically demonstrable that during the
last 43¥2 to 48¥2 feet of plaintiff's course along 18th East
Street, the defendant's approaching automobile was within his field of vision.
At a point 20 feet north of the south edge of the sidewalk on the north side of Stratford Avenue, plaintiff
would have a field of vision for a distance of 205 feet east
of the intersection (more. than 218 feet east of the point
of impact). At this point the plaintiff would be 48lh
feet from the point of impact. This distance is calculated
as follows: 20 feet from the point of observation to the
south edge of the sidewalk, plus 12¥2 feet from the edge
of the sidewalk to the edge of the hard surfaced portion
of Stratford Avenue plus 14 feet from the edge of the
hard surfaced portion of the road to the center line of the
road plus 2 feet (22 inches) from the center of the road
to the northern-most skid marks left by the defendant's
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auton1obile. These distances are taken from the plaintiff's Exhibits C and D and from the testimony of the
plaintiff.
Taking the evidence in the light n1ost favorable to
the plaintiff, as "\Ve must in this case, let it be assumed
that the plaintiff "\vas traveling at a rate of speed of 10
miles per hour, (15 feet per second) the lowest speed
at "~hich he testified to traveling. At that rate of speed
plaintiff would require about three seconds to travel
from a point 20 feet north of the intersection to the point
of impact. If the defendant was traveling at a speed of
30 miles per hour ( 44 feet per second), he would at the
time when plaintiff was 20 feet north of the intersection
be 132 feet east of the· point of impact; at 35 miles per
hour or 51 feet per second he would be 153 feet east of
the point of impact; at 40 miles per hour or 59 feet per
second he would be 177 feet east of the point of impact;
at 45 miles per hour or 66 feet per second he would be 198
feet east of the point of impact and at 50 miles per hour
or 74 feet per second he would be 222 feet east of the point
of impact (about 209 feet east of the intersection). All
of the above calculations are based upon the assumption
that the defendant traveled at a constant rate of speed up
to the point of impact. However, it is undisputed that
for at least the last 57 feet prior to the moment of impact, the defendant was decelerating, so that at the various speeds assumed he would have been several feet closer
to the point of impact, than indicated in the calculations.
It is thus obvious and not open to dispute that if the defendant were traveling at any rate of speed up to 50
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miles per hour, he was within the plaintiff's field of vision at all times after the plaintiff was within 48lf2 feet
of the point of impact.
As plaintiff proceeded southerly from a point 20 feet
north of the intersection his field of vision rapidly expanded. At a distance only five feet further to the south,
that is at a point 15 feet north of the intersection, his field
of vision had had n1ore than doubled and had increased to
a distance of 465 feet east of the intersection. From this
point the defendant's automobile would have been within
plaintiff's field of vision even had defendant been traveling at a rate of 100 miles per hour.
Of course, there is no evidence in the record whatsoever to warrant a finding that defendant was traveling at a rate of speed greatly in excess of 32 miles per
hour. Officer Farnsworth testified that skid marks 57
feet in length would indicate that the defendant was
traveling about 32 miles per hour. Since he had not come
to a full stop at the end of the skid marks he would have
been going somewhat faster than 32 miles per hour but
as to how much faster there is no evidence whatsoever
in the record. We are unable to find any evidentiary
basis for planitiff's suggestion that the defendant was
traveling 45 to 55 miles per hour. However, if he were
traveling at that speed, as claimed by the plaintiff, defendant was within the plaintiff's field of vision for at
least the last 43~ feet of his progress toward the point
of impact, and if he was traveling at that rate of speed
it would be fair notice to the plaintiff that the defendant had no intention of yielding the right of way to hi1n.
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Plaintiff testified that he could stop in a distance
of le~s than fiYe feet at the rate of speed at 'vhich he
was traveling. On his O"\Yn testimony, therefore, he could
haYe aYerted the accident had he observed the defendant's car at any time before he "\Yas within 5 feet of the
point of impact. Under these circumstances the conclusion appears to us inescapable that not only was the
plaintiff guilty of negligence but that that negligence contributed substantially, directly and proximately to the
accident and to its lmfortunate consequences to the plaintiff. We believe that this case falls squarely within the
principles of Bullock v. Luke and s·ine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co. and not within the principles of Hess v.
Robinson, Jfartin v. Sheffield and ·Lowder v. Holley.
The facts of this case directly parallel those in Bullock v. Luke. In both cases the accident occurred early
in the morning, in broad daylight, on dry roads, and with
good visibility. In both cases the plaintiff was the driver
on the right and therefore technically entitled to the right
· ·of way. In Bullock v. L1tke, under the evidence most
favorable to him, the plaintiff failed to observe the defendant's approaching vehicle until he (plaintiff) was
20 feet south of the intersection line, notwithstanding that
he had a view of 200 feet to the west when he was 60 feet
south of the intersection line and 800 feet to the west when
he was 20 feet south of the intersection line. In the instant case, the facts make an even stronger case of contributory negligence. Here the plaintiff failed to observe
the defendant until the plaintiff was actually within the
intersection, notwithstanding the fact that he had a view
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of 205 feet to the east at a point 20 feet north of the intersection and 465 feet to the east when he was 15 feet from
the intersection and he was traveling at a rate of speed
of less than half of that of the plaintiff in the Bullock
case, and thus had greater opportunity to make observations. The language of this court in Bullock v. Luke
would seem to be applicable with equal force to the case
at bar. It was there said :
"At 20 feet south of that line, he could have
seen 800 feet west. Why, then, didn't he see Luke
before the time claimed by him~ There is but one
conclusion. He, Bullock, was not looking. By reason of his failure to look, he did not discover Luke
until it was too late."
See also the language in the concurring opinion of
Justice Wolfe:
"And the evidence shows that not only was
he not sure that another would not be in his way
but that he never looked in time to determine how
he should regulate his speed. Such driving through
intersections is a constant occurrence. The law
should pronounce it indisputably negligent."
(Italics ours.)
And as observed by Justice Wolfe in conclusion:
"This rule encourages both drivers to be careful· * *

'

*"

The facts in the case of Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 147 Pac. (2d) 875, also closely parallel those
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in the case at ba.r. In that case the plaintiff was a passenger for hire in a t~~i cab owned and operated by the
defendant. The cab was proceeding westerly on Sixth
South Street in Salt Lake City, and was involved in a
eollision 'vith another automobile at the intersection of
3rd West Street. The intersection was not controlled
by either a stop sign or a semaphore. The driver of the
defendant's cab had a view of 200 feet to the south of the
intersection when he was at a point 50 feet east of the
intersection. K ot,vithstanding this fact, he failed to observe the approach of the other automobile from the south
until he was ·within the intersection, at which time it was
too late to avoid a collision.
In a long and well considered opinion by District
Judge Baker, it was held, as a matter of law, that the
defendant was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. While we dislike to burden
the Court with lengthy quotations, we feel that the following language from the opinion of Judge Baker is
pertinent and we therefore take the liberty of quoting
rather copiously:
"One of the fundamental duties which defendant Butcher owed to his passenger, the plaintiff,
was to keep a vigilant lookout for other vehicles
along the highway upon which he was traveling.
As he approached the intersection where the accident occurred, he was bound to anticipa.te the
presence of other vehicles that might be crossing
his line of travel, and to govern his conduct accordingly. 42 C.J. 91, Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish Co., R.I., 193 A. 622; RichSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 P.
439. Among other things it was his duty as he
approached the intersection to look in both directions along the intersecting street, and not merely
in the direction from which vehicles having the
right of way over him might be approaching.
42 C.J. 963. The supreme rule of the road as to
motorists at street intersections in cities is the
rule of mutual forbearance. Ward v. Clark, 232
N.Y. 195, 133 N.E. 443. The foregoing rules were
particularly applicable to Butcher because he was
the driver of a cab for hire. Butcher could not
moreover, insist with impunity upon his right of
way in the face of an apparent danger arising
from the negligence of another approaching from
the unfavored direction. If in such case he saw,
or in the exercise of due care should have seen,
the Hall car approaching at an excessive rate of
speed or otherwise indicating that the right of
way was probably not going to be yielded to him,
he should have slowed down, or stopped or otherwise have taken appropriate measures to avert
a collision. Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice, Perm. Ed. vol. I, p. 494, § 682;
Hogan v. Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540; Shelton
Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S.W. 2d 468;
Petri v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 328 Pa. 396, 195 A.
107.
"Actual possession of the right of way, as
opposed to a physical position of two vehicles
with reference to the intersection which might
under the statute confer it, presupposes that
motorists entering the intersection have exercised
due care, including that of keeping a proper lookout. In the case of a taxi driver that means that
he must keep such a lookout as will conduce to
the safety of his passenger. The operator of a
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taxirab may not place his passenger in a place
of in1n1inent peril through his O\vn failure to keep
the lookout \\~hirh the la\v requires of him, and
then after a collision has orrurred absolve himself
of negligence by asserting that, after all, he had
the right of \Yay. Neither may he absolve himself
by asserting that the collision was due solely
to the fault of the other driver, if that fault
might have been discovered, and its consequence
avoided by the exercise of due care on his part.
Hogan v. ~!iller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540.
·~_.A_s \Ye have already indicated, Butcher was
required not only to look for cars approaching or
entering the intersection, but to look effectively,
and 'vas charged with knowledge of all that a
prudent and vigilant operator would have seen
had he looked. 42 C.J. 911; Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish Co. supra; Huddy Cyc. of Automobile Law, 9th Ed., Vol. 3-4, Sec.
48.
"* * * The facts as we view them have been
recounted above. So far as the lookout kept by
Butcher is concerned, they reveal that he did not
look at all until he had entered the intersection
and this despit-e the fact that his view south on
Third West Street was clear and unobstructed for
a distance of 200 feet from a point 50 feet east of
the intersection of Sixth South Street, within
which limits Hall was at all times visible to
Butcher had he looked. * * * Certainly, in light of
the fact that Butcher's view was unobstructed, it
cannot reasonably be said that his observation of
the Hall car was at the first opportunity, nor at a
point which conduced to the protection of his passenger. Bullock v. Luke, supra. At the time he
first saw the Hall car approaching he had by his
negligence placed himself and his passenger in a
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position of peril from which he did not, and probably could not, extricate himself by the exercise
of any degree of care. Therein Butcher was
guilty of negligence.
"It is to be observed that we are here confronted with a situation where there was an entire
failure of the operator of the cab to keep the look-·····
out that was required of him. By his utter failure
to look until a time when the accident had become
unavoidable, Butcher deprived himself of the
opportunity to do anything which might have
avoided the collision. Had he looked sooner and
in response to what such observation revealed
attempted in some manner to have avoided a collision then, perhaps, a question of fact would
arise as to whether or not he had exercised that
degree of care demanded by the circumstances
and his relationship to the plaintiff. As the facts·
present themselves, however, viewed in a light
favoreble to the defendants, Butcher failed to
look when he should. He kept no look-out such
as would be effective for the due protection of his
passenger. In so doing he failed to perform one
of the essential duties he owed to his passenger,
and therein was guilty of negligence as a matter
of law. Bullock v. Luke, supra; Block v. Peterson, 284 Mich. 88, 278 N. W. 774; Jacobsen v.
O'Dette, 42 R.I. 44 7, 108 A. 653; Thibodeaux v.
Star Checker ·cab Co., La. App., 143 So. 101.''
(Italics ours) .
Chief Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion
agreeing both with Judge Baker and with the remarks
of Mr. Justice McDonough. We quote below from the
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe :
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~~ \\: e

n1ust not n1aneuver the la'v into such a
position that 'Ye put on a driver using due care
the duty to avoid the effect of another's negligence. That 'Yould n1ake each driver an insurer
against the effect of the other's actions. In this
cnse the distinction is well preserved. Butcher
did not exercise due care in relation to his fare.
He failed to look when looking would have been
effective. Had he looked at a point 50 feet back
of the intersection or at least so far back of it as
to permit him to conduct his driving in relation
to the exigencies 'Yhich might arise out of the
conduct of Hall, he might have slowed to a speed
below 20 miles an hour. * * * We can say as a
matter of law as we did in the Bullock case that
entering an intersection without timely observation is negligence. But can we say as a matter
of law that such negligence proximately caused
the accident J? In order to do that we must be
able to say that had Butcher looked sooner the
degree of care toward his fare with which he
was charged, he it ordinary or extraordinary,
would in law demand that he act differently than
he did in this case. While I am not without doubt
in the matter I think we can say as a matter of
law that had he sized things up ai a moment or
two earlier he would, in view of his speed and
the speed of Hall, have had to make different
accommodations in order to discharge the duty
he owed his fare. The failure to make such accommodations contributed to the accident and the
failure to sooner look resulted in the failure to
make the accommodations. Thus the chain between failure to look and the accident is established as one of proximate cause." (Italics ours).
Judge Larson also wrote a concurring opinion from
which we quote as follows:
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"It is the duty of every driver approaching
an intersection to anticipate that other persons
may be in, or about to enter. the intersection, and
to govern his conduct accordingly. State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P. 2d 429; Richards v.
Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 P. 439.
And since he must anticipate that others may be
approaching or entering the intersection it becomes his duty to look to both sides and ascertain
that it is reasonably safe for him to enter and
pass through the intersection, and he cannot be
heard to say that he did not see that which he
should have seen had he looked. * * * I conceive
the rule of the Bullock case to be this : A driver
approaching an intersection must anticipate that
there may be other cars approaching the intersection and before entering the intersection must
look both ways and note any vehicles near or
approaching the intersection. If the position
and speed of the other user of the highway is
such that a reasonably prudent man would think
he could cross in safety he may proooed through
the intersection and will not be guilty of negligence. But, if the conditions are such that a
reasonably prudent driver would be apprehensive
of danger in crossing through the intersection,
then to do so would be negligence. This without
regard to who has the right-of-way unless theintersection is one controlled by semaphore lights
or other definite means of control of traffic, at the
intersection. And one may not rely upon the rightof-way or assume the other driver will stop unless
the circumstances and l;>ehavior of the other driver
are such that a reasonably prudent man would
conclude that the other driver was going to stop
and yield him the right-of-way.
"* * * Butcher, driving west, approached the
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intersection-"There there 'vas no traffic director,
semaphore, or stop sign-at 20 miles per hour.
Hall, driving the other rar was coming north
toward the intersection, at 40 miles per hour.
'"\7Jlen Butcher 'vas 50 feet from the intersection,
he had an unobstructed view of the intersecting
road to the south of him for 200 feet, had he looked
in that direction. At that time, Hall would have
been approximately 100 feet from the intersection
-well within the field of vision-and traveling
about 60 feet per second, or less than two seconds
time from the intersection. Butcher was going
about 30 feet per second, or less than two seconds
time from the intersection. Had Butcher looked,
as it \Vas his duty to do, he would have seen this
very apparent danger. Since the record is silent
as to Hall's behavior as he approached the intersection but he did not stop or slow down, we must
assume that there would have been nothing in
Hall's conduct to justify Butcher in concluding
that Hall would stop and yield him the right of
way***." ·
We quote also from the opinion of Mr. Justice
l\fcDonough as follows :

"I concur. The defendant's own testimony
reveals that he did not look to the south along
the intersecting highway before reaching a point
where observation was ineffectual. The situation
therefore, is the same as though he had driven
heedlessly through the intersection without looking at all. He drove his fare into a position of
danger without having placed himself in a position to determine whether he, under the statute
defining the right of way, had the right to proceed; he negligently failed to inform himself of
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the hazard presently encountered so as to exercise that care toward his passenger which the .law
enJOins.
"S·uch situation differs from one where a
driver, having performed the duty of observing,
exercises a reasonable judgment as to the right
of precedence and, absent evidence that his right
was not going to be respected by the driver of
another car, proceeds. Under such a state of facts,
it is usually for the trier of fact to evaluate such
driver's conduct; although, in some circumstances
such driver would in my opinion be free from
negligence as a matter of law."

*

* *

* *

"* * * That he might have avoided the accident by a slight acceleration of speed or by slowing down, after becoming cognizant of the approach of the other car, is demonstrated by the
physical facts. Had he made such choice under
the exigency confronting him, his choice· of other
than the most safe of the courses open to him,
would not be negligence in law. But here his
failure to observe, evaluate and act should in my
opinion be held to be the cause of his vehicle
being placed in the path of the other car." (Italics
ours).
Notwithstanding the fact that none of the members
of the court concurred outright in the opinion of Judge
Baker, all of them appear to agree quite fully with his
views and we find no dissent therefrom.
We believe that the decisions in the Bullock case
and Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company are
controlling of the case at bar and it is on these decisions
which we rely for affirmance of the trial court. The facts
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of this case distinguish it from the cases of Mart in vs.
Sheffield, Hess vs. Robinson and Lou·der vs. Holley.
In Hess vs. Robinson, the case was held to be for
the jury because the plaintiff was entitled to assume
that the defendant 'vould obey the stop sign and yield
to the plaintiff. There was no stop sign at the intersection involved in the case at bar and hence the rule of
Hess vs. Robi-nson would have no application here.
In lJJartin vs. Slzeffield, the case was held to he for
the jur~~ because there '""as a substantial dispute in the
facts as to the speeds at which both of the cars were
traveling and as to whether or not the defendant stopped
before the collision. We are not confronted with any
such difficulties in this case. The facts are substantially
without dispute, and taking the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the conclusion is irresistible
that the plaintiff's failure timely to observe the defendant's approaching automobile and to take steps to avert
the collision was in fact a substantial contributing cause
of the accident.
In Lowder vs. Holley, the case was held to be for
the jury because there was evidence which would warrant a finding that the defendant was at least 250 feet
from the intersection at the time the plaintiff entered
the intersection. No such finding is permissible under
the evidence adduced in the case at bar. Assuming the
defendant to have been traveling at the rate of 50 miles
per hour, he would have been at a distance of less than
200 feet from the intersection at a time when the plaintiff was 20 feet north of the intersection; and at the time
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the plaintiff entered the intersection the defendant could
not have been n1uch more than 100 feet east of the intersection. At the time the plaintiff entered the intersection
he still had adequate time and space in which to halt his
vehicle and to avoid the accident, and if the defendant
were traveling at 50 miles per hour that would have been
fair notice to the plaintiff that the defendant had no
intention of yielding the right of way.
We have carefully examined the cases of Hunter v.
Michaelis, 198 Pac. (2d) 245, Mingus v. Olsson, 201 Pac.
(2d) 495, Nielson v. Mauchley, 202 Pac. (2d) 547, Spackman v. Carson, 216 Pac. (2d) 640 and Compton v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., 235 Pac. (2d) 515, all of which
are cited in plaintiff's brief, and we do not see that any
of them are sufficiently close in point of fact to be of
any assistance to the court in determining the case at
bar.
Hunter v. Michaelis was a case involving a pedestrian being struck by an automobile. It was decided
under the laws of the State of California and the court
specifically observed that it expressed no opinion as to
whether the case would be ruled the same under the law
of Utah. Moreover, in that case the plaintiff not only
looked before attempting to cross the street, but looked
and reappraised the situation twice during the course
of her traverse of the street.
Mingus v. Olsson is likewise a pedestrian case. In
that case a pedestrian was held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matte-r of law in failing to observe and
take heed of the defendant's app-roaching vehicle. In
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so far as the principles of that case have any relationship to the case at bar, it is favorable to the defendant
and not to the plaintiff.
The case of Nielson v. Ma1tchley is likewise different
on its facts. In that case the plaintiff observed the defendant's bus \vhen he was 300 feet away and he .continued to observe the bus and watch its movements during the entire course of his travel toward the bus. He
also made an appropriate reduction in his speed as he
approached the bus. He was entitled to assume under
the facts of that case that the bus would yield the right
of way to him. When it became apparent that the bus
would not yield it was too late for the plaintiff to avoid
the accident. The case is entirely different on its facts
and involves an entirely different question of law.
The case of Spackman v. Carson is somewhat similar
to Nielson v. Mauchley and bears no resemblance to the
facts in the case at bar. There the plaintiff observed
the defendant's vehicle parked along side the road as
he proceeded toward it and when he was about 200
feet away. There was nothing about the appearance of
the vehicle which would indicate that it was about to
move onto the road. Plaintiff next observed it when it
was about 30 feet away and at that time it was moving
on to the road in front of him. That is quite a different
situation from a case where a car is observed or is
observable approaching an intersection at a fairly rapid
rate of speed. In such a case it can only be inferred
that the driver of such an automobile intends to traverse
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section n1ust in the exercise of reasonable care pay heed
to this fact. By express statement of the court, the holding of the Spackman case is limited strictly to its own
facts.
The case of Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot
Co. involved a pedestrian being struck by a train. She
was held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to observe the approach of the train.
If that case has any bearing on the case at bar, it supports the position of the defendant.
The following quotation therefrom, has some pertinence to the facts in the case at bar :
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her
duty to look and listen for trains before going
on the tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks
to the north, well before she got far enough west
to be in the path of a train. Under the evidence
the engine was there to be seen. If decedent had
looked at any time, either as she started, or as
she pursued a course parallel to, but dangerously
near the tracks, she must necessarily have seen
the train approaching. She was therefore, either
negligent in failing to look or in failing to heed
the train if she saw it."
The rule that both drivers involved in an intersection collision are guilty of negligence as a matter of
law is a healthy rule and conforms to the realities of
modern day driving conditions. In truth and in fact,
under ordinary circumstances, it is possible for an
intersection collision to occur only where both drivers

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
are guilty of some laxity. In the ordinary situation an
intersection collision "\Yill not and cannot occur unless
both of the drivers fail to see each other, or, having
seen one another, attempt to \vin a race across an intersection. No prudent driver "\vill attempt to cross an
intersection, even though technically entitled to the right
of way, unless there is no driver approaching from the
intersecting high,va.y so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, or unless such approaching driver has
clearly indicated an intention to yield the right of way.
In the face of a rapidly mounting accident toU, resulting in the loss of 35,000 lives and physical injuries to
one million persons annually, and property damage
a1nounting to untold millions of dollars, a rule requiring
both parties approaching an intersection to take the
utmost precaution would seem to be a salutary principle. It will be a most unusual factual situation where
one driver involved in an intersection collision can say
that he was blameless in the matter. Obstructions to
vision would not ordinarily be any excuse. Where an
intersection is blind the driver approaching should make
an appropriate reduction in speed and even come to
a complete stop if necessary before essaying to cross.
As was so well said by the court in Conklin v. Walsh,
193 Pac. (2d) 437, 439:
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver.
Neither driver can excuse his own failure to
observe because the other driver failed in his
duty. Neither driver is at any time to be excused
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for want of vigilance or failure to see what is
to be seen."
We are fully mindful of the desirability that traffic
should flow freely and with a minimum of delay, but
we do not believe that a rule requiring careful and
reasonable observations on the approach to, and entry
of, intersections need necessarily to detract from this
end. We are not so much concerned, in cases of this sort,
with arterial highways, where traffic is regulated by
semaphores and protected by stop signs. In those areas
where intersections are not controlled by semaphores,
stop signs, or other devices, traffic ordinarily is very
light and will not be unduly burdened or delayed by a
rule which requires careful observations at all intersections.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court was correct and is
In accordance with the rules and decisions heretofore
laid down by this court and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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